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This article takes as its starting point a peculiar land claim within the ongoing South 
African land restitution process – more specifically, the legal and administrative 
technicalities that allowed for the implosion of the accompanying court case in the 
Land Claims Court – to open up a space for reflection on the ambiguous nature of state 
bureaucracies as ambiguity-reducing machines. Tracing the specificities of bureaucratic 
attempts at foreclosing ambiguities and insufficiencies in state practice, I show how 
a reorientation towards the new public goods of ‘service delivery’, ‘transparency’ and 
‘accountability’ brought about a pronounced regime of performance indicators and 
de-judicialized bureaucratic flexibility. Demonstrating how these attempts to reduce 
ambiguities created new zones of ambiguity and unaccountability of their own, I argue 
for a post-Weberian analysis of the path-dependent realities of ‘bureaucratic authority’ 
to help us understand the seemingly arbitrary structural violence that state bureaucracies 
often enact. 
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The Opening of a Trial That Wasn’t
At around 9.45 on the morning of Monday 20 February 2012, I arrived at the Land 
Claims Court in Randburg, South Africa. As so often before, I had driven to this 
Johannesburg suburb to participate in court proceedings pertaining to the ongoing 
South African land restitution process. Restitution is an exemplary site where the moral 
modernity of the new South African state has been contested, renegotiated and made 
(see Zenker 2012; Zenker forthcoming a, b and c). Over the course of fourteen months 
of fieldwork conducted between 2010 and 2013, I traced land restitution within and 
between various state institutions (like this court), focusing on four exemplary claim 
settings all related to the former homeland KwaNdebele. 
On this morning I was quite excited because this was to be the first day of a long 
trial, scheduled to last two weeks, concerning a large restitution case, and I was looking 
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forward to getting into the details of both the legal procedures and the contested facts 
of this particular case. My anticipation was further fuelled by the fact that I had come 
to the Land Claims Court with similar prospects on so many prior occasions, only 
then to observe how the parties swiftly settled outside court within hours, typically in 
favour of the current (white) landowners opposing the claim. As I was about to learn, 
the situation would not be very different on this Monday morning. 
Upon entering the building and greeting the members of staff I had become so 
well acquainted with, I learned that the legal representatives of the parties were already 
busy negotiating in Courtroom 2, while the presiding judge was still in his chambers 
waiting for the parties to come forward. I decided to go to see the judge, who was in the 
company of his assessor (an advisor appointed in restitution matters on a case-by-case 
basis), who – on this occasion – was a former Chief Land Claims Commissioner and 
professional advocate. We sat down and chatted, and the judge summarized the day’s 
case for me. The trial, he explained, was to deal with the merits of the claim – that is, 
with the validity of the plaintiffs’ claim to a right to restitution, which was contested 
by the current landowners. The Baphalane Ba Ramokoka community claimed to have 
been dispossessed of their rights to a large area of land – all in all, seventy-six portions 
of more than twenty farms situated near Rustenburg in the North West Province. This 
dispossession, the community claimed, satisfied the legal requirements for restitution 
according to post-apartheid law (see below), and hence entitled its members to 
restoration of the land. This claim was opposed by the Atlanta Northam Land Claim 
Action Committee, formed by a group of seventy-three affected white landowners. 
After l eaving t he j udge’s c hambers, I  w ent t o C ourtroom 2 , w here t he l egal 
representatives of the various parties were busy discussing among themselves, working 
on a laptop or skimming through documents. In the gallery I counted twelve people 
(all clients, as I learnt), of whom it appeared only one was a member of the claimant 
community, while the other eleven were most likely members of the landowner 
committee. I greeted and briefly chatted with the lawyers of the different parties, most 
of whom I knew quite well through my earlier participant observation in court. Around 
11.30, the lawyers of the claimants, the Minister of Land Affairs, and the Land Claims 
Commission came in and handed over to the landowners’ lawyers a draft agreement 
on a USB stick. All of the lawyers present then gathered around a laptop and started 
negotiating the contents of this draft, amending it in accordance with their decisions. 
Once all were satisfied, t he l egal r epresentatives o f t he l andowners d iscussed t he 
terms of the draft with their client representatives in the gallery. After the clients had 
consented to it as well, several printouts of the draft were made, one of which was then 
handed over to the judge and the assessor to scrutinize while all lawyers and clients 
waited in the courtroom. 
After a short time, the door to the bench opened. The usher came in and announced, 
‘All rise! I call case number LCC 09 2007’. Everyone stood up as the judge and the 
assessor entered the bench. After all had sat down, the advocates, first of the plaintiffs 
and then of the defendants, stood up and formally introduced themselves. The judge 
then noted that, as the second judge was not yet present, there was not a full bench. It 
was agreed that section 28(8) of the Restitution Act (see below) still allowed the court 
to proceed, and that the order to be sent out should be signed by both judges. The 
judge 
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then abruptly declared: ‘This draft order is made an order of court!’ He subsequently 
went on to commend the parties for managing to settle, stating: ‘One must not settle 
always, but if the matter is settle-able, then one should settle! The Court adjourns’. 
The usher again gave the ‘All rise’ command as the judge and the assessor exited the 
courtroom.
It was only after saying goodbye to everyone that I found the time to think about 
how, surprisingly, the contested merits of this claim could have been settled so quickly. 
Among the various provisions within the order, four issues seem most important: first, 
that the ‘plaintiffs abandon their land claims for physical restoration against properties’ 
of the ‘land owner defendants’, who ‘are hereby released from the further proceedings 
under the above-mentioned case number LCC 09/2007’;1 second, that the ‘finalisation 
of the plaintiffs’ restitution claims and in particular entitlement to [sic] of the plaintiffs 
to equitable redress, shall be subject to negotiation between the plaintiffs and the first 
defendant [i.e., the Minister of Land Affairs], through the Commission [on Restitution 
of Land Claims], failing which, the decision of the Court’;2 third, that ‘the plaintiffs have 
indicated their desire to negotiate the purchase of some of the farms previously under 
claim’;3 and fourth, that the Minister and the Commission are ordered ‘jointly and 
severally’ to pay virtually all legal costs of the landowners, albeit on the lower ‘scale as 
between party and party’, including their lawyers’ ‘reservation fees for the first four days 
of the trial’, originally scheduled for ten days but which had just ended so prematurely.4
Now, how is one to make sense of this astonishing agreement in which the claimants, 
before even arguing their case, suddenly rescinded their demand for the restoration 
of the land? After all, if they were indeed entitled to restitution, as they continued 
to insist through their sudden demand for ‘equitable redress’, they had every right to 
press their claim against the will of the current owners,5 a claim that they had already 
been pursuing through legal channels for the previous five years. How is one to relate 
the outcome of such legal proceedings to the new state’s attempt to right the historical 
wrongs of colonial land dispossession? And, finally, in what ways does such ‘a trial 
that wasn’t’ open up a space for reflection on the diverse processes and intricacies, the 
possible profits and pitfalls, of more flexible bureaucracies built on ‘new public goods’?
In the pursuit of answers to these questions, I will first engage with the remarkable 
transformation of what, during the anti-apartheid struggle, was a highly politicized 
land question into a strictly juridified and judicialized field of state proceedings in the 
new era. This will provide some necessary background information for understanding 
more clearly how this trial (that wasn’t) was made possible in the first place. I will 
then show how the low annual rates of settling land claims during the new restitution 
programme’s first five years led to a state reorientation towards ‘new public goods’ such 
as service delivery, transparency and accountability. This was mainly achieved through 
a de-judicialization of restitution, on the one hand, and an increasing use of land claim 
settlement statistics as indicators of state performance, on the other. Although this has 
indeed led to a remarkable increase in measurable public performance, with settlement 
rates accelerating rapidly, this process of making the administrative bureaucracy more 
flexible has simultaneously freed it substantially from systematic judicial review. I will 
then focus on the inadvertent absurdities that such a reduction (or, as we will see, 
outsourcing) of review has made possible – not least in missing the opportunity that 
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our trial would have afforded to publicly review both the merits of the claim and the 
quality of state officials’ work. I will conclude with some reflections on the implications 
of attempts like these to establish more flexible bureaucracies based on ‘new public 
goods’ for the closure of bureaucratic ambiguity.
The Juridification and Judicialization of ‘the Land Question’ at the End 
of Apartheid
Colonialism in South Africa was, at its core, crucially intertwined with state laws 
controlling access to land. While divergent provincial regulations had existed before, 
since the Natives Land Act (Act 27 of 1913) a plethora of countrywide legislative acts 
increasingly restricted black people’s land rights,6 thereby legalizing their massive 
dispossession, and circumscribed their movement in space. The racial segregation that 
ensued had enormous consequences, limiting their civil and political rights, curbing 
their access to resources, labour and capital, and severely constraining their social and 
cultural lives.
It is therefore not surprising that the history of race-based land dispossession 
persistently occupied a prominent position in the struggle against colonialism (Walker 
2008: 50–51). For decades, anti-apartheid activists protested, fought legally and 
documented the race-based dispossession of land and forced removals involving an 
estimated 3.5 million black people between 1960 and 1983 alone (Abel 1995: 385–522; 
Platzky and Walker 1985: 10). The Freedom Charter, officially adopted by the Congress 
of the People in 1955, demanded that ‘all the land [shall be] re-divided amongst those 
who work it’ (African National Congress [ANC] 2011); this document continued to 
inspire the struggle for democratization for decades to come. Thus when apartheid 
was nearing its end in the late 1980s, many ANC activists assumed that a key priority 
of any future land reform would be a politically endorsed nationalization of existing 
land holdings (Klug 2000: 125) – and it is a demand that flares up in popular discourses 
in South Africa to the present day. It was therefore not at all clear at the beginning 
of the transitional negotiations in the early 1990s that one of the central aims of the 
liberation movement − to bring about equitable access to land through the restitution 
of dispossessed lands to their original owners − would ultimately rely on a strictly 
juridified approach under the rule of law.
Blichner and Molander (2008) offer a helpful discussion of ‘juridification’, 
identifying five distinct dimensions: (1) constitutive juridification, which refers to 
the expansion of a whole legal order, for instance through a formal constitution; (2) 
juridification as the expansion of law into hitherto unregulated domains; (3) 
juridification as increased conflict resolution with reference to law (in and beyond 
courts); (4) juridification as the increased power of the judiciary; and (5) 
juridification as the legal framing of subjectivities. As it so happened, the South 
African transitional negotiations, dominated by the ruling white supremacist 
National Party (NP) and the ANC, ended up thoroughly juridifying ‘the land 
question’ in terms of the first four dimensions (and, in the long run, also in the fifth). 
Walker (2008: 51–69) describes in detail how this development came about. She 
shows that, for senior ANC members, nationalization of land looked less and less 
like 
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a viable option, given the negative experiences with state farms in socialist countries, 
fears about the destruction of commercial agriculture, growing pressure from local and 
transnational capital in favour of market-based land reform, the spectre of ensuing capital 
flight, and a general political moderation of the ANC in its attempt to win consensual 
endorsement. Against this backdrop, enshrining existing land rights and land reform 
into the new constitutional bill of rights developed into a matter of strategic compromise 
– especially as the still ruling National Party strongly insisted on safeguarding property
rights, particularly concerning agricultural land (Walker 2008: 54). Eventually, this
brought about the current Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of
1996), which protects both property rights and the right to redress for racially based
violations of past property rights (Klug 2000: 124–136; Walker 2008: 50–69).
In this process, the politicized land question – and land restitution in particular 
– became profoundly juridified, first through constitutive juridification (dimension
1), with the new Constitution for all South Africans now explicitly stipulating in
section 25(7) that a person or community dispossessed of property as a result of past
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an act of
Parliament, either to land restoration or to equitable redress. The hitherto unregulated
domain of how to restore land to its former owners became subsequently juridified as
well (dimension 2), when the act of Parliament in question – the Restitution of Land
Rights Act (Act 22 of 1994) – defined the legal framework for the restitution process
and established the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights and the specialist Land
Claims Court as its key players. The Act further provided a set of criteria according
to which claimants are either entitled to ‘land restoration’ or ‘equitable redress’: the
claimant can be an individual or a community (whose land rights were derived from
shared rules determining access to land held in common); the claimant must have been 
dispossessed of a right to land after 19 June 19137 on the basis of racially discriminatory 
laws and practices; and finally, claimants must not have received just and equitable
compensation – and (originally) had to lodge their claims before 31 December 1998.8
Significantly, the right in land to be restituted was explicitly not limited to former
freehold ownership, but was defined much more broadly.9
Under this specific rule of law, the Act construed ‘the state’ as simultaneously 
functioning as the core reference point (as claims are lodged against the state, i.e., the 
Minister of Land Affairs), the champion of claimants through the Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights (under the same minister) and the judicial arbiter through 
the Land Claims Court (under the Minister of Justice). Within this setting, once 
Commission officials verified the validity of a claim, they were tasked with aiming for 
a settlement agreement between claimants and (usually white) landowners, whereby 
the state would buy the land and, based on certain conditions, hand it over to the 
claimants. With or without such an agreement, however, each of the approximately 
80,000 claims lodged initially had to be referred to the Land Claims Court for final 
settlement. This meant that land restitution was further juridified in the sense that each 
case had to be ultimately resolved in court with reference to law (dimension 3), thus 
giving the final say and substantial power to judicial review (dimension 4). This dual 
juridifying process of empowering courts is often more specifically referred to in terms 
of ‘judicialisation’ (Blichner and Molander 2008: 45).
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In this remarkable juridification and judicialization of the formerly politicized issue 
of ‘the land’, South Africa is not unique. In recent decades there has been a massive 
increase worldwide in constitutionalism, faith in the judiciary and ‘the rule of law’, with 
more than one hundred constitutions (re)written since 1989 (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2006: 22; see also Klug 2000; Tamanaha 2004). Globally, as John and Jean Comaroff 
(2006: 26) observe, a ‘judicialization of politics’ is taking place, in which ‘[p]olitics itself is 
migrating to the courts’, although this ‘fetishism of the law’, as they put it, often amounts 
to little more than ‘lawfare – the resort to legal instruments, to the violence inherent in 
the law, to commit acts of political coercion’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006: 26, 22, 30; 
see also Randeria 2007). Such globally circulating patterns of juridification – possibly, 
but not necessarily repressive in their effects (see Eckert et al. 2012a, 2012b; Zenker 
2012) – have indeed broadly shaped the emergence of South African land restitution 
as a legal process. However, for current purposes it seems more important to highlight 
that restitution, while still principally juridified, subsequently experienced a marked de-
judicialization that has had profound consequences for its future operations.
The New Public Goods of South African Land Restitution and the Shift 
Towards De-judicialization and Indicatorization 
When the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights took up its work in early 1995, 
the then Minister of Land Affairs, D erek Hanekom, declared t hat t he work of t he 
Commission would be finished in t hree years (Walker 2008: 8 ). In i ts 1997 White 
Paper on South African Land Policy however, the Department of Land Affairs had to 
shift its deadlines for the restitution process, providing for a three-year period for the 
lodging of claims, a five-year period for the Commission and the Court to finalize all 
claims and a ten-year period for the implementation of all court orders (Department 
of Land Affairs 1997: para 4.13). Yet these and subsequent deadlines for finalizing all 
claims proved elusive again and again. At the time of writing (in 2014), the (original) 
restitution process had still not been completed, while the period for lodging land 
claims was recently reopened and extended until 30 June 2019 (see endnote 8).
Although the institutional triad of the Land Claims Court (LCC), the Commission 
and the Department of Land Affairs ( DLA)10 h ad b een p rincipally l aid o ut i n t he 
Restitution Act (see above), the somewhat ambiguous competencies of each body soon 
led to tensions, to the detriment mainly of the Commission. On the one hand, frictions 
arose from the fact that the Commission seemed to be institutionally independent of the 
DLA, while the latter’s de facto mandate was, according to Walker (2008: 6), ‘to fund, 
staff and resource the Commission, represent the interests of the state (against whom 
all claims were lodged) in the negotiations process, and manage the implementation 
of restitution settlements’, since the responsibility of the overarching land reform 
programme, incorporating restitution, lay (and still lies) with the Minister of Land 
Affairs. On the other hand, the power of the Commission – already obliged to refer 
settlement agreements to the LCC to make them court orders – was further curtailed 
by subsequent case law in which the LCC not only made use of its exclusive jurisdiction 
to review and alter Commission decisions, but further specified that the role of the 
Commission was merely ‘an investigative and facilitatory one’ (Tong 2007: 38).
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Within this set-up, the actual process of settling land claims proved frustratingly 
slow: in 1997, the very first claim was settled by the Court, and it remained the only one 
for that entire year; in 1998, the total number of settled claims rose to seven, climbing to 
a total of forty-one in 1999. This was an intolerably low settlement rate, given that about 
80,000 claims awaited their finalization in the file storage rooms of the Commission. 
Against this backdrop, the Minister of Land Affairs ordered a review in 1998, leading 
to marked changes in the restitution process, including amendments of the Restitution 
Act that transformed the formerly judicialized into the current administrative process: 
now the Minister of Land Affairs, and by delegation the Land Claims Commissioners, 
have the power to facilitate and conclude settlements by agreement, and only claims 
that cannot be resolved this way take the judicial route through the Land Claims Court. 
Furthermore, in 1999 the Commission became closely integrated into the DLA, and 
both the Chief Land Claims Commissioner and the Minister of Land Affairs were 
replaced by the new President Mbeki, leading to a major exodus of senior staff in the 
Department of Land Affairs in 1999−2000 (James 2007: 36–40; Walker 2008: 12–14; 
Zenker 2015).
This de-judicialization in the late 1990s took place in the increasingly globalized 
context of neoliberal discourses and public policy orientations captured by the imagery 
of ‘new public goods’ such as efficiency, flexibility, transparency, accountability, data-
based monitoring and evaluation within an overarching ‘audit culture’ (Power 1997; 
Strathern 2000). In fact, the strong emphasis on more pragmatism, realism and efficient 
state performance in land reform generally, which emerged in 1999 under the new 
Mbeki administration, can be seen as part of a broader shift of this government towards 
more explicitly neoliberal policies (James 2007: 40, 32). Under these circumstances, the 
de-judicialization of the restitution process, as described above, was evidently deemed 
a crucial strategy in order to bring about such new public goods. 
Another strategy in the service of more efficient public ‘service delivery’, also 
emerging around that time, consisted in increasingly treating numbers and land 
claim settlement statistics as indicators of state performance.11 In 1997 the White 
Paper on South African Land Policy already referred abstractly to the need to develop 
‘service standards with clearly defined outputs, targets and performance indicators’ 
(Department of Land Affairs 1997: para 6.5.2). However, it was only through the Mbeki 
administration’s strong emphasis on drastically speeding up the restitution process that 
settlement statistics, such as annual settlement rates, were consciously transformed into 
explicit indicators of state performance. This deliberate use of numbers to measure the 
new public good of efficiency has also transformed the state’s rhetoric of transparency 
and accountability: in recent years, it has become standard procedure within the DLA 
and the Commission to publicly refer to the numbers of claims settled in terms of 
‘output performance measures’ and ‘indicators’, and to use these figures to measure 
retrospectively actual performance against target performance (see, for example, 
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights 2012: 13). All in all, this has led to a situation 
in which ‘[g]overnment and public opinion have mainly measured the achievements of 
restitution quantitatively in terms of the number of claims settled and people who have 
benefitted, and the extent of land restored to claimants’ (Hall 2010: 28).
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The c ombined e fforts of  tu rning th e DL A (i ncorporating th e Co mmission), 
through de-judicialization, into a more flexible bureaucracy, w hile s imultaneously 
pressing for efficient service delivery through transforming settlement statistics into 
‘transparent’ and ‘publicly accountable’ indicators of state performance, apparently 
bore fruit: between March 1999 and March 2007, the annual rate of settling claims 
moved between a minimum of 2,772 claims (in 2006/7) and an impressive maximum 
of 17,783 (in 2001/2), adding up to a total of 74,417 claims reported as ‘settled’ in 
March 2007, that is, 93.38 per cent of the total of 79,696 claims lodged. In that year, the 
Commission also reported that it was ‘entering the most difficult part of the restitution 
process’, since it was now only left with outstanding rural claims that were often very 
complex and quite difficult to  resolve (C ommission on Restitution of  Land Rights 
2007: 3). Correspondingly, the rates again substantially decreased to only a reported 
few hundred claims settled per year since 2007. Nevertheless, the total number of only 
3,673 outstanding claims, as reported in March 2011, seems to point to considerable 
success in getting South African land restitution to benefit from ‘the new public goods’.12
Outsourced Review and (all too) Flexible Bureaucracies
The story of this apparent success by the numbers is, of course, not that straightforward. 
As I have analysed elsewhere, worrying inconsistencies regarding the published 
statistics have been noted and have even been publicly acknowledged by the DLA 
(Zenker forthcoming b). Furthermore, the problem of quantification leaving out so 
much of the marked specificity of each land claim highlights the profound ambiguity 
involved in comparing and counting as ‘settled’ completely different cases and settings 
(ibid.). Finally, the use of quantifiable indicators to measure success – a process I shall 
refer to by the somewhat ungainly term ‘indicatorization’ – has developed a social life 
of its own, producing various unintended consequences with, in fact, adverse effects on 
the finalization of the land restitution process (ibid.). These and other problems related 
to indicatorization have been rightfully criticized (Walker 2008; see also Walker 2012), 
highlighting the need to get a grip on the unintended consequences of indicatorization, 
improve the quality of national statistics and provide more adequate resources for 
meaningfully finalizing all claims. 
Yet such criticism is unlikely to change substantially the importance of 
settlement statistics as ‘boundary objects’ (Star and Griesemer 1989: 393) 
linking the local arena of individual claims with the national arena of public 
accountability. As such, I argue that these numbers allow land restitution to be 
processed in the local arena of individual injustices and private interests, as well as 
in the national arena of public accountability and new public goods, thus enabling 
‘the state’ to translate, and hence balance, divergent interests and concerns (see 
Zenker forthcoming b). In recent years, rather than continuing to privilege the 
private interests of a lucky few, indicatorization has tipped this balance in restitution 
towards a stronger emphasis on public interests, which insist that relative justice is 
given to all claimants in a justifiable time span and that public funds are spent in a 
cost-efficient way.While the strategy of indicatorization thus has to some 
extent increased public accountability of the restitution process, ironically its 
partner strategy, de-
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judicialization, has simultaneously undermined such accountability in profound ways. 
This is so because the now de-judicialized Restitution Act concentrates substantial 
powers in the hands of the Minister of Land Affairs (and, by delegation, the DLA, 
incorporating the Commission), while simultaneously freeing him/her substantially 
from systematic judicial review. The Minister may now enter into an agreement with 
all interested parties, which crucially include, on the one hand, the current landowners 
and, on the other, in the final analysis only the Minister him- or herself – the Janus-
faced representative of both the Commission as the champion of the claimants and ‘the 
state’ against which all claims are lodged. In other words, given that the current owners 
are evidently not opposing the claim – otherwise there could be no agreement in the 
first place – the Ministry is effectively left to its own devices to decide on the validity 
of the claim without any external review. Correspondingly, this setting implies that 
any judicial review through the Land Claims Court only comes into existence when an 
interested party – usually the current landowners, but sometimes also the claimants13 – 
oppose the decisions of the Minister, the DLA or the Commission. Only then does the 
Court enter the restitution process or, more to the point, only then must the restitution 
process enter the Court for independent review. In effect, this means that the function 
of ensuring any judicial review of the restitution work by the administrative state is 
outsourced to private interested parties – and in the case of current landowner, usually 
at their own cost, as cost orders in restitution are rare (more on that below).
This outsourcing of judicial review has turned the administrative state of restitution 
into an all-too-flexible bureaucracy, confronted with the constant temptation to act 
with impunity when dealing with unopposed land claims. But the administrative 
bureaucracy is endowed with still greater flexibility, and thus faces greater temptations, 
in cases that actually are contested. Given that land claims are lodged against the state 
and not against current landowners, the latter become interested parties only if a 
valid claim is made for ‘land restoration’ rather than ‘equitable redress’ (for example, 
financial compensation). Thus, although a valid claim in principle entitles a claimant 
equally to land restoration or equitable redress (as long as restoration is feasible), the 
current landowners only become affected if the reparation sought consists of the actual 
land. This has profound consequences because, in court cases involving opposing 
landowners, the Minister of Land Affairs, as representative of the Commission, has 
already agreed that the claim is valid (otherwise there would be no court case), whereas 
the same Minister, as the first defendant representing ‘the state’, does not oppose his 
or her own decision about the validity of the claim. Thus the dispute usually lies only 
with the landowners; if they can be removed from the proceedings, then the court case 
collapses. This is easily achieved, of course, if the claimants decide no longer to claim 
‘land restoration’ but rather ‘equitable redress’. In that case, the whole matter turns into 
an affair of mutual consent between claimants and, in the last instance, the Minister (as 
both claimants’ champion and the target of their legal demands) – a ‘tryst with destiny’ 
that is neither disturbed nor confronted by current landowners, judges or any other 
sceptical member of the public.
Against this background, the openings of the trial-that-wasn’t evoked in this text 
can be seen in a new light. Needless to say, the ‘true’ reasons for the court interactions 
described above remain forever shrouded in mystery. But as an illustration of the ways 
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in which the new public good of ‘publicly accountable service delivery’ in South African 
land restitution has produced its own zones of potential unaccountability, this case 
might actually work as a useful exemplar. In this spirit, let us have a closer look at the 
technicalities of this court order. Of the four important issues in the order mentioned at 
the beginning of this text, the first and the second point illustrate that the de-judicialized 
set-up of restitution indeed allows abandoning a ‘land claim for physical restoration’, 
so that the ‘land owner defendants’ are ‘hereby released from the further proceedings’, 
leaving the ‘finalization of the plaintiffs’ restitution claims and in particular entitlement 
… to equitable redress … to negotiation between the plaintiffs and the first defendant 
[i.e., the Minister of Land Affairs], through the Commission’. While in the course of such 
negotiations, the Minister might theoretically find against such an entitlement – always 
allowing the legal possibility, as the order emphasizes, that a future disagreement between 
claimants and the Ministry might again necessitate ‘the decision of the Court’ – such a 
development is rather unlikely. This is because the Ministry had already committed itself 
thoroughly to the validity of the claim; otherwise there would not have been a court case 
in the first place. De-judicialized restitution hence provides unaccountable spaces for 
covering up not only invalid claims but also, and more to the point, improper behaviour 
by the administration. This is particularly tragic in cases where claimants actually do 
have a valid claim but, due to inadequate research and the sloppy work of state officials, 
end up being forced to rescind their claim to ‘land restoration’ and to settle, as a last 
resort in order to get at least some compensation, through ‘equitable redress’, which is 
usually of much lower monetary value. 
When viewed from this angle, the third point of the court order becomes quite 
interesting: evidently, rightful claimants may ask for either land restoration (if feasible) 
or equitable redress, and they may, of course, change their demands in the course of 
legal proceedings. Perhaps claimants such as those referred to in the opening case 
simply preferred monetary compensation over land? But then why would they still 
formally indicate ‘their desire to negotiate the purchase of some of the farms previously 
under claim’? 
It remains to consider the last of the four points, namely that the Minister and the 
Commission were ordered to pay basically all legal costs of the landowners, if only on 
the lower ‘scale as between party and party’. Here it is crucial to emphasize that, unlike 
in other legal proceedings, cost orders in South Africa land restitution are actually 
quite rare.14 The Land Claims Court, as a court of equity, has the discretion ‘to make 
orders for costs as it deems just, including an order for costs against the State or the 
Commission’.15 Thus far, the precedent has been that the LCC only grants cost orders 
against the state either at the lower scale as between party and party or as punitive 
cost orders at the higher scale as between attorney and client if the bench is convinced 
that the state profoundly misbehaved. Seen in this light, it seems rational for the 
administrative state to voluntarily include a cost order against itself (albeit at lower 
scale), only if it fears that, should the court case proceed, the opposing party would 
reveal profound misbehaviour on the part of the state, leading to a cost order anyway. 
While it is impossible to say, and ultimately immaterial, whether the line of 
reasoning sketched out here was also part of the motivation behind the collapse of the 
trial in the Baphalane Ba Ramokoka community claim, this overall analysis opens up 
a 
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space for reflection concerning the intricacies of modern rational-legal ‘states at work’ 
(Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014) and, more specifically, the possible profits and 
pitfalls of flexible bureaucracies built on the edifice of new public goods. 
Closing in on Closures of Bureaucratic Ambiguity 
In their recent attempt at ‘rethinking the state’, Migdal and Schlichte (2005) propose 
what they call a post-Weberian conception of the state, describing it as a field of power 
characterized by dialectics between ‘the image’ of a unitary, territorially bounded, 
supreme law-making organization with compulsive membership that claims a 
monopoly on legitimate violence and representation of the people, and the enormously 
variable ‘actual practices’ realized in ostensible orientation towards such an image, 
involving those officially empowered by such representation and those they engage in 
their roles as ‘officials’ (see esp. Migdal and Schlichte 2005: 15). This approach – which 
finds echoes in Sharma and Gupta’s (2006) suggestion to investigate everyday practices 
and representations of the state – insists on treating the Weberian ideal-type of the state 
as precisely this: an idea and ideal that informs not only social research, but equally 
functions as one meaningful orientation, alongside others, for practices within and 
beyond actually existing ‘states’ (see Migdal and Schlichte 2005: 10–11). In this sense, 
it becomes possible also to investigate Weberian ‘bureaucratic authority’ – that is, the 
ideal-type characterizing rational-legal modern statehood, with its belief in the legality 
of enacted rules, domination through knowledge and an emphasis on circumscribed, 
rule-bound jurisdiction, office hierarchy, file keeping and expert training, as well as 
officialdom as a full-time profession (Weber 1978: 56, 215–226, 956–1005) – less as an 
adequate model of reality and more with regard to the multiple realities of this model 
in actors’ thoughts and practices.
Interrelated clusters of actors that profess to orientate their practices principally 
towards such an image of ‘rational-legal modern statehood’ and are socially recognized 
as acting in its name – in other words, actually existing state bureaucracies – are often 
perceived as ‘ambiguity-reducing machines’, organizing their technical knowledge 
through classification, standardization, quantification and routine (Best 2012: 91–92; 
see also Handelman 2004: 19–41; Scott 1998: 11–83). Ambiguity constitutes a form 
of indeterminacy, referring to ‘the polyvalence of social life’ and ‘the inescapability of 
interpretation’ (Best 2008: 356). As such, it represents a core problem for bureaucracies, 
leading to the strategies for ambiguity reduction mentioned above. However, as Best 
(2012: 91–93) points out, too forceful a reduction of ambiguity in the workings of 
bureaucracies may equally hamper their responsiveness in the light of always-given 
uncertainties, diversities and limits to quantification and indicatorization (as discussed 
above). Hence, there are also incentives for bureaucracies to foster at least some 
ambiguity in order to use it as a strategic asset for governing (Best 2008: 356). 
In addition to identifying a broad empirical spectrum of ambiguities, ranging from 
deliberately reduced to actively fostered forms, Best (2012) insists that despite clever 
mechanisms for reducing the ambiguities of social interaction, they tend to persist, 
not least because the very efforts to constrain such ambiguities inevitably create new 
ones. In other words, besides empirically variable ambiguities, ‘residual ambiguities’ 
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that exceed our controlling efforts also exist (ibid.: 88–91). In this sense, ambiguity can 
be summarized as impacting on the actual work of bureaucracies in three ways: as an 
object of governance fundamentally in need of rule-bound control; as a strategic asset 
for governance, creating room for discretion; and as a principal and inevitable limit to 
any governance (Best 2008). 
Lipsky’s (2010) seminal work on the dilemmas of the individual in public service 
might help shed further light on the possible interrelations between these three forms 
of bureaucratic ambiguity. Lipsky focuses on a category of state officials that he calls 
‘street-level bureaucrats’, characterized both by direct interaction with citizens as clients 
of public services and by their ‘substantial discretion in the execution of their work’ 
(Lipsky 2010: 3). He argues that notoriously limited resources, conflicting goals of their 
agencies, the concomitant absence of clear performance measures and highly complex 
situations on the ground lead to situations in which street-level bureaucrats – such as 
restitution officials within the South African administration – have relative autonomy 
from organizational authority and exercise wide discretion. One of Lipsky’s central 
theses is that this state of affairs de facto turns the day-to-day actions of street-level 
bureaucrats − and not their agency’s official statements − into the ultimate determinant 
of state policies (Lipsky 2010: 13–25). Summarizing Lipsky’s observations in terms 
of bureaucratic ambiguity, one might say that in the foundational attempt to control 
ambiguity as an object of governance through establishing and following explicit rules 
– that is, in orienting state action towards ‘bureaucratic authority’ – and given the 
inevitable presence of residual ambiguity that is beyond control, new ambiguity is 
produced allowing officials discretion both in ‘applying’ rules differently and in hiding 
behind a façade of indifference (see Herzfeld 1992).
Arguably, a similar mechanism has been at play within the shift in South African 
land restitution towards more flexible bureaucracies based on new public goods. The 
attempt to govern ambiguities in the early restitution process produced an imbalanced 
preference for the private interests of a chosen few at the expense of all other claimants 
and public interests more generally. This led to new public goods such as service delivery, 
transparency and accountability being evoked as corrective bureaucratic measures. 
However, given the polyvalence of social life and hence residual ambiguity, the newly 
produced, more flexible bureaucracies have entailed their own ambiguities: on the one 
hand, land restitution has profited greatly in terms of a drastically accelerated settlement 
process and some increase of public accountability through indicatorization. But on 
the other hand, the de-judicialization that was deemed necessary to make possible 
this more efficient service delivery has created profound pitfalls of unaccountability 
for a process ostensibly oriented towards the image of the modern rational-legal 
state. It has provided the means for possibly shielding an overburdened and partly 
incapable bureaucracy against external review and judicial scrutiny, and has thereby 
both jeopardized the restoration of land to rightful claimants and allowed for the abuse 
of public funds.
This mechanism of de facto production of new bureaucratic ambiguities through 
the attempt to reduce such ambiguities, given the inescapably ambiguous nature of 
the only means of closure at hand, leads recursively to an infinite regress that is at 
the heart of the constant metamorphosis of ‘the modern state’. This does not mean, of 
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course, that since bureaucratic ambiguity is inescapably in excess, new public goods 
are merely old goods in new stately bottles: plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. On 
the contrary, it is in tracing the path-dependent, historically situated specificities of 
attempted bureaucratic closures of ambiguity that it becomes possible to close in on 
some of the reasons behind often peculiar state actions which – as Gupta (2012) points 
out – in their structural violence otherwise appear as nothing but arbitrary.
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Notes
1. See 2012 02 20 Baphalane ba Ramokoka Community and Others v Minister of Agriculture and Land
Affairs and Others (LCC 09/2007, unreported), sections 1 and 5.
2. See 2012 02 20 Baphalane ba Ramokoka Community and Others v Minister of Agriculture and Land
Affairs and Others (LCC 09/2007, unreported), section 3.
3. See 2012 02 20 Baphalane ba Ramokoka Community and Others v Minister of Agriculture and Land
Affairs and Others (LCC 09/2007, unreported), section 9. 
4. See 2012 02 20 Baphalane ba Ramokoka Community and Others v Minister of Agriculture and Land
Affairs and Others (LCC 09/2007, unreported), section 8.
5. It is a common misunderstanding in South African public opinion, unfortunately perpetuated
within some of the academic literature (e.g., Hall 2010; Lahiff 2007), that land restitution – like land
redistribution – is conducted under some kind of ‘willing-buyer willing-seller’ policy whereby ‘the
owners of the claimed property have an effective veto on land restoration’ (Hall 2010: 25). This is not
the case, as owners are merely entitled to just and equitable compensation as defined in section 25(3) of 
the Constitution, but cannot prevent land restoration if it is the remedy desired by rightful restitution 
claimants and deemed feasible by the state.
6. I use the conventional categories African, Indian, coloured, black (as inclusive of the previous three
categories) and white to describe the different social groups that were identified as ‘distinct’ under
the apartheid system, while acknowledging the dilemma that the inevitable usage of these socially
constructed terms might reinforce their alleged ‘reality’ as biologically predetermined categories. 
7. This was the day of the promulgation of the Natives Land Act, first legalizing massive dispossessions
countrywide by introducing racial zones of possible landownership and by restricting black reserves to 
only 7 per cent of South African land (later to be extended to 13 per cent).
8. On 29 June 2014, President Jacob Zuma signed the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act (Act 15 
of 2014), which reopened the period for lodging land restitution claims and extended it until 30 June
2019.
9. For a discussion of the implications of this broad definition for the evolution of property regimes, justice
and social reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa and its subsequent development in case law,
see Zenker (2014). 
10. The Department of Land Affairs (DLA) was officially renamed the Department of Rural Development 
and Land Reform in 2009. However, in order to avoid confusion, I continue to refer to it as the
Department of Land Affairs or DLA in this text.
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11. For a detailed account of this indicatorization of South African land restitution, see Zenker (forthcoming
b).
12. See Zenker (forthcoming b) for a compilation of annual settlement statistics published by the
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights in its Annual Reports between 1996 and 2013.
13. This category of dissatisfied black claimants making use of their right to direct access to the Land Claims
Court is very often also joined by white land claimants (see Zenker forthcoming c).
14. As claimant communities often qualify for legal aid, whereas current (white) landowners do not, the
latter usually end up having to pay their own costs, which causes frustration and anger. As an opposing 
white landowner in another case that I have investigated put it, ‘I had to pay my own lawyers, while
the state was on the side of the claimants … We had to prove out of our own pockets that it was our
own land, for which we had title deeds and everything’ (see Zenker 2014: 517). Understandable as
this frustration might be with regard to individual tragedy, this situation reflects precisely the broader 
racialized political economy of South Africa that land restitution is meant to at least partly redress.
15. See Restitution of Land Rights Act (Act 22 of 1994), subsection 35(2)(g).
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